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COMMENT
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE TREND TOWARD MORE
STRINGENT NLRB STANDARDS ON
ARBITRAL DEFERRALS
An employee is discharged under disputed circumstances. The
employer contends that the employee was fired because she produced "low quality work," while the employee claims that the
employer dismissed her because she engaged in union activities,
and that the discharge therefore violated her statutory right to engage in such activities under section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA or the Act).1 The employee protests her
termination and, in accordance with the grievance arbitration
clause 2 contained in the applicable collective bargaining contract,
the dispute is submitted to an arbitrator. The arbitrator upholds
the discharge because "just cause" 3 for it was proven. The arbi129 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). This section makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer, "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization." Id.
2A contract arbitration clause is a provision in a collective bargaining agreement typically providing that disagreements arising during the contract period,
over the meaning of contractual terms are to be resolved by the submission of the
disputes to an arbitrator---"an impartial person designated by the parties for just
that purpose." Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review, 80 COLumT. L. BEv. 267, 275 (1980). Professor Gorman has sketched
the operation of these clauses:
Complaints of contract breach . . . are typically brought, by the union
or the individual grievant, to a low-level supervisor in the first instance,
and if unresolved to higher levels of supervision. If the dispute remains
unresolved at the highest level of confrontation between union officials
* . . and company officials . . . it will be submitted to an arbitrator,
voluntarily selected by the parties to the contract.
R. Gon.mAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR I.Aw 541-42 (1976). See generally [19761
LAB. REL.Ex znrTm (BNA) 15.
A recent Bureau of National Affairs study of 400 collective bargaining agreements reported that 96% of the contracts surveyed provided for the arbitration of
grievances. [1979] 2 Cor-L cnvE B nGAna,---NEco.roNs AND CONTRACTS
(BNA) § 51:5.
3 A general statement to the effect that an employee may be discharged for
"cause," "just cause," or "proper cause" was found in 80% of the collective bargaining agreements surveyed by the Bureau of National Affairs. [1979] 2 CoLrECTrVE

BARcAININc-NEcOTIATIONS

AND

CONTRACTS

(BNA)

§ 40:1.

These

clauses
exclude discharge for mere whim or caprice. They are, obviously, intended to include those things for which employees have traditionally
been fired. They include the traditional causes of discharge in the particular trade or industry, the practices which develop in the day-to-day
(738)
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tration award does not mention the employee's claim that her statutory rights were violated. Seeking vindication of her section 8(a)(3)
claim, the employee files unfair labor practice charges with the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board). Basing its
decision on its policy of dismissing unfair labor practice complaints
when the allegedly illegal conduct has been the subject of a previous
arbitration award, the Board dismisses the charges. The arbitration award is left as the final judgment in the dispute.
In the hypothetical situation just presented,4 the reason given
for dismissal of the employee's complaint is a long-standing Board
policy that is known as the "deferral doctrine." r Established in
Spielberg Manufacturing Co.,6 it permits an arbitrator, rather than
the Board, to decide cases in which the statutory protections of the
NLRA are at least partially at issue. The deferral issue arises only
when the conduct complained of can be found violative of the
NLRA despite the legality of the same conduct under a collective
bargaining agreement. In the introductory hypothetical, for example, the Board could find that the employer committed a section
8(a)(3) 7 violation even if the prior arbitration award upholds the
employer's action as valid under the contract, because the contractual "just cause" standard under which the arbitrator evaluates an
employer's actions is not identical to the standard under which the
Board decides whether the action violates the statute. These "statutory rights" 8 disputes are typically brought before the Board as
relations of management and labor and most recently they include the
decisions of courts and arbitrators. They represent a growing body of
"common law" that may be regarded either as the latest development
of the law of "master and servant" or, perhaps, more properly as part
of a new body of common law of "Management and labor under collective bargaining agreements."
Worthington Corp., [1955] 24 LAB. Aim. R P. (BNA) 1, 7 (McGoldrick & Sutton,
Arbs.).
4This hypothetical fact situation closely resembles the facts of actual "deferral" situations. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367
(3d. Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Max Factor & Co., 105 L.R.R.M. 2765 (9th Cir. Sept.
9, 1980). See notes 41-66 and 76 infra & accompanying text.
5 "Deferral doctrine" and "deferral policy" are convenient phrases that are
technically inaccurate, but they have traditionally been used by the Board and
courts and will be used in this Comment. "Deferral" means postponement; e.g.,
postponement of a Board decision until after an arbitrator has decided the case.
As will be seen below, however, the issue in this area of labor law is whether the
Board will give deference to the arbitrator's decision on a statutory issue in a particular case. Thus, "deference policy" would be more accurate, but "deferral
policy" is the accepted term of art.
See notes 20-32 infra & accompanying text.
0 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
729 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). See note 1 supra.
8 Although complaints brought before the Board alleging violations of statutory
rights may also involve contractual issues, those complaints alleging violations of
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alleged violations of "individual" rights protected by sections 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3) of the Act. 9
In contrast to cases that involve both contractual and statutory
questions, the outcomes of disputes that hinge solely upon an arbitrator's construction of a provision in a collective bargaining agreement do not involve NLRB deferral. In such disputes, the interpretation given the contract resolves the unfair labor practice issue,
and no interpretation of the NLRA is necessary.10 For example, in
a case alleging that an employer violated section 8(a)(5) 11 by unilaterally-without prior bargaining with the union-changing wages
or working conditions, the critical issue is whether the applicable
collective bargaining agreement permits the employer's action. If
the arbitrator determines that the contract does not require bargaining prior to the employer taking unilateral action concerning a
particular term or condition of employment, then the employer's
action will not have violated the Act. In this situation the arbitrator is merely performing his traditional function of determining
the meaning and intent of contractual language. 12 The Board's
dismissal of the statutory claim does not involve "deferral" because
the arbitrator has not interpreted and applied the Act in reaching
his decision. 13 Only if the contract had no provisions covering the
duty of the employer to consult the union would the Act have to
be relied upon to resolve the dispute.
the statute that can be decided independently of coexisting contractual issues are
referred to throughout this Comment as statutory rights disputes.
929 U.S.C. §158(a)(1) & (3) (1976). Under section 8(a)(1) it is an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in" § 7 of the Act. Id. § 158(a) (1).
Section 7 protects employees' rights to "self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively . . . and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining, or other mutual aid or protection .... ." Id. § 157 (1976). See note 112 infra. For the text of the relevant
portion of § 8(a)(3), see note 1 supra.
'0 See, e.g., Bay Shipbuilding Corp., 251 N.L.B.B. No. 114 at 6-7 (Aug. 27,
1980).
1129 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). This section states that it shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer, "to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees." Id. Suits alleging the violation of this obligation
to bargain are also typically brought by employers under § 8(b) (3) of the Act.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1976).
12See United Steelworkers v. Warrier & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1959). See also notes 39-88 infra & accompanying text.
13 This Comment is addressed to Board deferrals to arbitration awards when
the conduct at issue is arguably violative of both an employee § 7 right and a
contract provision, rather than those cases in which an interpretation of the contractual language will conclusively settle the issue. The latter situation does not
really involve deferral at all, because the Board is not charged with the power to,
hear purely contractual disputes. See notes 23-25 infra & accompanying text.
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Recently, the NLRB has retreated from its policy of deferring
to arbitration in the former type of cases-those in which statutory
violations could potentially be found regardless of the arbitrator's
contract interpretation. This policy shift has been effected through
a series of Board decisions limiting the circumstances under which
it will defer to arbitration awards. 14 In turn, the change in Board
doctrine has evoked in several courts of appeals a more stringent
application of their traditional standard of review of deferral decisions.1 5

In NLPLB v. Pincus Brothers, Inc.-Maxwell,16 for ex-

ample, the Third Circuit attempted to inhibit the NLRB's current
retreat from its deferral policy by applying the widely-accepted
"abuse of discretion" standard of judicial review of Board refusals
to defer in a way that makes such refusals extremely difficult for the
Board to justify.17 However, in NLRB v. Max Factor & Co.'18-the
first court of appeals decision rendered on this issue since Pincus
Brothers-the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the Third Circuit's
rigorous application of its standard of review. 9
The conflict among the courts of appeals on the standard of
review issue will be explored in this Comment in the context of a
discussion of the changes that the Board has recently made in its
deferral policy. First, this Comment discusses the Board's Spielberg
policy of deferring to the decision of an arbitrator in cases involving
statutory issues. Second, it analyzes the Third Circuit's treatment
of deferral policy in Pincus Brothers in the context of the Board's
recent attempts to limit the doctrine. Third, it examines the impact that the Board's policy shift will have on the roles that both
the arbitrator and the NLRB will play in the determination of the
legality of conduct that is arguably violative of both a collective
bargaining contract and the NLRA. Finally, it will assess the relative merits of the Board's past and present deferral policies.
The Comment concludes that, due to the Board's failure to
state explicitly its current deferral policy, the Pincus Brothers court
14 See

text accompanying notes 118-44 infra.
15 See note 72 infra.
16 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980).
37 See notes 72-74 infra & accompanying text.
At least two other courts of
appeals have recently placed similar restraints on the Board. See District 1199E,
Nat'l Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1102 (D.C.
Cir. 1979); Douglas Aircraft Co. v. NLBB, 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979). But
see NLRB v. Max Factor & Co., 105 L.R.R.M. 2765 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 1980);
Saint Luke's Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 104 L.R.R.M. 2788 (5th Cir. May
21, 1980); Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLB, 587 F.2d 403, 407-08 (9th Cir.
1978).
18 105 L.R.R.M. 2765 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 1980).
19Id. 2769 n.7.
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misinterpreted the Board's present view on arbitral deferral and
established an inappropriate precedent governing the application
of its standard of review of NLRB refusals to defer. A possible
solution to this tension between the Board and some courts is
offered. First, the Board should state explicitly that it has changed
its "deferral" policy to something more akin to the "adoption" of
arbitration results that comport with Board case law on any statutory issues implicated by the conduct underlying the complaint.
Second, courts of appeals should review Board deferral decisions in
a way that gives the Board more, rather than less, discretion to
decide how to treat an arbitrator's award. This would comport
with present Board law on deferral and would permit the Board to
execute more effectively the public policy functions it has been
charged with under the NLRA.
I.

THE ROOTS OF THE DEFERRAL DOCTRINE

The NLRB's practice of deferring to arbitration awards based
upon conduct that is implicated in a subsequent unfair labor
practice complaint was initiated in Spielberg Manufacturing Co. 20
In that case, the Board dismissed a complaint alleging that an employer's refusal to reinstate four strikers violated sections 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3) of the Act.21

This dismissal was based on the Board's

recognition of a previously rendered arbitration award that did not
require the reinstatement of the discharged employees. In the
course of dismissing the unfair labor practice complaint, the Board
established a set of standards for determining when deferral to an
arbitrator's award is appropriate: it must be shown that "the [arbitration] proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all parties
had agreed to be bound [by the arbitration award], and the decision
of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes
and policies of the Act." 22
By claiming to defer to arbitration awards in a given case only
if the three criteria stated above are met, the NLRB was implicitly
20112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).

Prior to this decision the Board and the

courts of appeals had considered the issue of deference to arbitration awards, but
had not established any explicit set of guidelines. See, e.g., NLRB v. Walt Disney
Prods., 146 F.2d 44, 48 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 877 (1946);
Wertheimer Stores Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1954); Monsanto Chem. Co., 97
N.L.R.B. 517, 519-20 (1951), enforced, 205 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1953); Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946), reo'd on other grounds, 161 F.2d
949 (6th Cir. 1947).
21 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082. See notes 1 & 9 supra.
22 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082.
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attempting to accommodate the tension it erroneously perceived
between two statutory provisions, section 10(a) of the NLRA and
section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley)
Act (LMRA). Section 10(a) is designed to protect an employee's
statutory rights. It empowers the Board "to prevent any person
from engaging inany unfair labor practice . . .affecting commerce.
This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment
or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement,
law, or otherwise . . . . "2 Section 203(d) of the LMRA is designed to encourage the voluntary adjustment of contractual disputes. This section states that "[fjinal adjustment by a method
agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method
for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement." 24
There is no statutory reason why the Board cannot, in the context
of deciding a statutory rights dispute, accept an arbitrator's prior
decision on a related contractual question while refusing to give
any deference to the arbitrator's decision on the statutory issue.m
That the Board in Spielberg developed guidelines for deferring to
such statutory decisions perhaps demonstrates that it was trying to
balance sections 10(a) and 203(d),2 6 a process it should not have
27
undertaken.
The accommodation reached in Spielberg between these two
statutory provisions was expressly designed to encourage the voluntary adjustment of labor disputes through arbitration.28 1 Under the
Spielberg criteria, unless the arbitrator's award is so irrational as
to be "palpably -wrong," the Board adopts the arbitrator's decision
as controlling on the unfair labor practice issue presented it.25
2329 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976)

(emphasis added).
2429 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976) (emphasis added).
25
Indeed, in dictum, the Supreme Court has spoken of the value of this
type of complementary decisionmaking. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36; notes 145-49 infra & accompanying text.
26
This statutory balancing process was explicitly acknowledged by the Board
in at least two later cases: Collyer Insulated Wire, A Gulf & Western Systems Co.,
192 N.L.R.B. 837, 840 (1970), and International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B.
923, 925-26 (1962), enforced sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
2
7 See notes 171-79 infra & accompanying text.
2sThe Board stated in Spielberg that "we believe that the desirable objective
of encouraging the voluntary settlement of labor disputes will best be served by
our recognition of the arbitrator's award." 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082.
29
See, e.g., International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 928-29 (1962),
enforced sub horn. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 1003 (1964).
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30
Mere disagreement is not a ground for ignoring the award, nor
31
can the Board simply "shrug off" the conclusions of the arbitrator.
Only when the award clearly does not meet the Spielberg standards
will the Board disregard an arbitrator's decision and decide the
32
case itself.
This deferral policy was, significantly, extended in Collyer
Insulated Wire, A Gulf & Western Systems Co.A3 to disputes that
had not even been submitted to arbitration. In Collyer, the union
filed a charge with the NLRB that the employer had violated
sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA by making unilateral changes
in wages and working conditions.3 4 The case turned on whether
or not the collective bargaining contract, which contained a grievance arbitration clause, authorized the employer to make such
changes. 5 The Board dismissed the unfair labor practice complaint
so that the parties could have an opportunity to resolve their contractual dispute through the arbitration process.36 In order to
eliminate the risk of prejudice to any party and to insure compliance
with the Spielberg standards, however, the Board retained jurisdiction of the dispute

solely for the purpose of entertaining an appropriate
motion for further consideration upon a proper showing
that either (a) the dispute has not, with reasonable promptness after the issuance of this decision, either been resolved
by amicable settlement in the grievance procedure or submitted promptly to arbitration, or (b) the grievance or
arbitration procedures have not been fair and regular or
37
have reached a result which is repugnant to the Act.
30

See, e.g., Pincus Bros., Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1063, 1064 (1978), enforcement

denied on other grounds, 620 F.2d 367 (3rd Cir. 1980); Hawaiian Hauling Service,

Ltd., 219 N.L.R.B. 765, 766 (1975),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1976).

enforced, 545 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976),

31 NLRB v. Wilson Freight Co., 604 F.2d 712, 723 (1st Cir. 1979), cert.

denied sub nom. Smith v. Wilson Freight Co., 445 U.S. 962 (1980).
32 See, e.g., United Steelworkers Local 7450 (Asarco, Inc.), 246 N.L.R.B. No.
139 (Dec. 7, 1979)

(no deferral where employee grievant not a party to arbitra-

tion hearing); Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 6 (1978) (no deferral
-where arbitration panel is biased and the proceedings unfair); Kansas Meat Packers,
198 N.L.R.B. 543 (1972) (no deferral where interests of employee grievants were
in conflict with the union representing them at arbitration hearing).
33 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
34 Id. See notes 9 & 11 supra.
35 192 N.L.R.B. at 839 ("this dispute in its entirety arises from the contraet").

S6 Id.

839, 841.

37id. 843 (footnote omitted).
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Thus, Collyer formally established the practice-for cases in which
a contractual decision might alleviate the need for a statutory adjudication-of the Board refraining from deciding disputes brought
before it until the arbitration process had been given a chance to
work. The NLRB claimed that this procedure "guarantee[s] that
there will be no sacrifice of statutory rights if the parties' own
processes fail to function in a manner consistent with the dictates
of our law." 38 Nonetheless, the standards that the Board enunciated
in Spielberg and Collyer made clear that the Board intended to
grant a considerable degree of deference to arbitration awards and
to the arbitration process.39

II. JUDICIAL

ENFORCEMENT OF THE Spielberg DOCTRINE:
NLRB v. Pincus Brothers, Inc.--Maxwell

A. The Decision
The Board's current deferral policy was recently analyzed by
40
the Third Circuit in NLRB v. Pincus Brothers, Inc.-Maxwell.
Pincus Brothers, Inc.-Maxwell (Pincus), a Philadelphia manufacturer and wholesale distributor of men's clothing, terminated a tw*oyear employee, Jane Richardson, in February of 1977.41 Richardson
protested her dismissal, which had been precipitated by her preparing and distributing during both working and nonworking time a
leaflet critical of Pincus's salary levels.
The firing was upheld by
an arbitrator, who found that Richardson "had abused working
time," and that the leaflet Richardson distributed intentionally
misrepresented facts relating to Pincus's practices in a manner that
constituted "unprotected disloyalty." 4
38 Id.
39

Additional evidence of the Board's favorable attitude toward arbitration
during that general time period can be found in Electronic Reproduction Service
Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974). There, the Board announced that, absent unusual circumstances, any statutory issues presented to it in deferral cases would
be presumed to have been decided by the arbitrator, regardless of whether such
issues actually had been considered. See text accompanying notes 133 & 134
infra.
It is noted that, because this Comment focuses on the Pincus Brothers decision
and its review of refusals to defer to arbitration awards, the Comment's discussion
will concentrate on that type of refusal, rather than refusals to defer under Coilyer.
40 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980).
411d. 370.
42The one-page leaflet, entitled "WE WON'T SAcnimscE oR PINcus' PoFrrs,"
referred to a recent plant meeting as a "circus" and accused Pincus of attempting
to cut the workers' "already stinking pay checks." Id. 370-71.
431d. 371. The arbitrator's latter finding signifies that he examined Richardson's claim that her § 7 rights were violated, but concluded that her activities
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While the grievance was pending, Richardson filed a section
8(a)(1)44 charge with the Board,45 claiming that she had been discharged for engaging in protected activity. After thoroughly examining the facts found by the arbitrator, the Board refused to defer
to his award upholding the discharge on the ground that "the arbitrator's findings that Richardson's conduct was unprotected [by the
NLRA] are so clearly in error that it would be repugnant to the
policies of the Act to defer to them."46 The case was remanded to
an administrative law judge, who found that Pincus had violated
section 8(a)(1). 47

The Board affirmed this decision,48 and sought

enforcement of its order in the court of appeals, but the Third
49
Circuit panel denied enforcement.
The issue facing the court was whether the Board should have
deferred to the arbitration award. 0 The panel's analysis was
directed toward determining the appropriate standard of review of
Board refusals to defer. The three-judge panel issued three separate
opinions. Judge Rosenn's "majority" opinion held that the Board's
refusal to defer could be overturned only if it constituted an abuse
of discretion.5 ' Judge Rosenn found that "[b]ased on the Board's
Spielberg doctrine, congressional action, and judicial decisions, . . .
it is an abuse of discretion for the Board to refuse to defer to an
arbitration award where the findings of the arbitrator may arguably
be characterized as not inconsistent with Board policy." 52 Applying
this standard, he concluded that the Board's refusal to defer in the
instant case was an abuse of discretion because Richardson's leafletwere outside the scope of-and thus unprotected by-§ 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
See note 9 supra. See generally R. Gom AN, supra note 2, at 296-325.
44
NLRA §8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). See note 9 supra.
45
For an outline of the procedural steps needed to be taken for a complaint
to reach the stage of Board consideration, see note 62 infra.
46
Pincus Bros., Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1063, 1065 (1978). The decision of the
panel, consisting of Members Jenkins, Murphy, and Truesdale, was unanimous.
47620 F.2d at 371. The administrative law judge initially hears unfair labor
practice cases in a "court-like proceeding" and prepares a decision. If exceptions
to the administrative law judge's decision are filed, the Board will formally review
the case. R. GonMAN, supra note 2, at 8.
48 620 F.2d at 371.
49ld. 377.
5oId. 369-70.
51Id. 372. This standard has been employed by several other courts of
appeals. See NLRB v. Max Factor & Co., 705 L.R.R.M. 2765 (9th Cir. Sept. 9,
1980); Hawaiian Hauling Service, Ltd. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 674, 676 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1976); NLRB v. Cincinnati Local 271, Lithographers
& Photoengravers Int'l Union, 495 F.2d 763 (6th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Hribar
Trucking, Inc., 406 F.2d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1969).
52 620 F.2d at 374.
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ting was "arguably unprotected activity." 53 The arbitrator's award
upholding the dismissal was therefore not "dearly repugnant" to
the Act 4
Judge Garth, concurring, reasoned that the Board "was compelled under its Spielberg doctrine to defer to the arbitrator's
award." 15 Unlike Judge Rosenn, however, Judge Garth believed
that the appropriate standard of judicial review is "legal error." 11
Although accepting the view that "national labor policy confers, as
an initial matter, discretion on the Board in formulating a position
on deference to arbitration awards," 57 Judge Garth contended that
the Board had exercised that discretion by adopting the Spielberg
standards.58 If an arbitration award meets those standards, Board
deferral is required as a matter of Jaw,5 9 and matters of law are reviewed under a legal error standard. 0
53 Id. 375.
Judge Rosenn found four possible grounds on which to conclude
that Richardson's conduct was unprotected: (1) an employee loses the protection
,of the Act when he or she makes "deliberately or maliciously false" statements,
and Richardson's conduct could arguably have been characterized as such; (2)
Richardson's conduct might have constituted unprotected disloyalty; (3) Richardson's conduct might have been inconsistent with the Act's "fundamental goal of
encouraging collective bargaining and industrial stability;" (4) it is "at least
arguable" that Richardson's action, "motivated by personal pique," was not con-erted activity. Id. 375-77.
5
4 See Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955); text accompanying
note 22 supra.
55 620 F.2d at 377 (Garth, J., concurring).
561d. See note 60 infra. Judge Garth acknowledged that "all of the courts
that have expressed themselves on the issue have indicated that the Board's
application of the Spielberg doctrine is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard," but found none of those opinions "compelling." 620 F.2d at 377.
57 620 F.2d at 377 (Garth, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
58 Id. 379.
59 Id. 383.
60Id. 380. The distinction between the abuse of discretion and legal error
standards of review is potentially significant. Under the former, the leeway given
the Board in deciding whether to defer varies dramatically from court to court.
It may be very limited, as in Pincus Brothers, where the Board is left with the
choice of either deferring to the award in a given case or proving that there is no
way to rectify it with the Act. See text accompanging note 52 supra. Conversely,
the discretion allowed may be very considerable, as in NLRB v. Max Factor & Co.,
where the Board is, in essence, permitted to interpret and apply its own precedents
in any way it sees fit, as long as the deferral decision at issue can be seen as
'being reasonable. 105 L.R.R.M. 2765, 2768, 2769 n.7.
While the abuse of discretion formulation does little to standardize the degree
of discretion afforded the Board by various courts of appeals, Judge Garth's legal
error standard seems to admit of but one reading: no Board discretion is permitted in determining whether the arbitration proceeding and subsequent award
have met the Spielberg criteria. The court of appeals is free to review the issue
-de novo, and reverse the Board's decision upon simple disagreement with it. 620
F.2d at 380. Because of Judge Rosenn's narrow application of the abuse of discretion formulation, the two standards discussed and used by the Pincus Brothers
majority are indistinguishable in their effect, but a contrast with the Ninth Circuit's application of the abuse of discretion standard amply demonstrates how
much more deference the Board is generally given under it rather than its Pincus
Brothers counterpart.
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Judge Gibbons, dissenting, argued that, except in a small class
of unfair labor practice cases,"' the NLRB does not have the statutory authority to defer to an arbitration award once its General
Counsel has issued a complaint.6 2 The General Counsel has "unreviewable prosecutorial discretion [and] it is hard to find in the
structure of the Act the authority for the Board to second guess the
exercise of that discretion." 63 Judge Gibbons found further support for his view by examining the public policy function of the
Act. He noted that the Board, not an arbitrator, is responsible for
interpreting and enforcing the Act.64 Because an arbitration award
will be able to do justice only in the individual case, "a remedy
selected by an arbitrator in processing an individual grievance may
be wholly inadequate to enforce the public policy against unfair
labor practices." 65 Judge Gibbons concluded that it would be
incorrect for the Pincus Brothers court to insist on Board deference
to an arbitration award after both the General Counsel and the
Board decided that deference was not in the public interest. 66
61 Judge Gibbons stated that the Board has the statutory authority to defer
to arbitration only in work jurisdiction disputes, because only in that type of
unfair labor practice situation is arbitration specially provided for by statute.
620 F.2d at 387. Section 10(k) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1976), provides for Board adjudication of such disputes unless the parties agree upon settlement or arbitration within 10 days after notice of the filing of the charge.
Judge Gibbons also recognized that there is a distinction between contractual
and statutory disputes. See notes 4-13 supra & accompanying text. He stated
that deferral may be appropriate in disputes in which "the predicate for the
charge may be entirely dependent upon the meaning of a collective bargaining
contract . . . . In such a case, which involves a pure contract dispute, once the
terms of the contract are determined the public interest in the matter ends."
Deferral under the
Pincus Bros., 620 F.2d at 391 (Gibbous, J., dissenting).
latter exception was, according to Judge Gibbons, not appropriate: resolution of
the employee's claim was not dependent "upon the meaning of a collective bargaining contract . . . [because] even if a contract remedy is available the conduct
complained of is independently illegal, and cannot be made legal regardless of
See text accompanying notes 106-17 & 145-49 infra.
the contract's terms." Id.
62 With regard to unfair labor practice complaints, the NLRB has three distinct functions. A complaint must be directed first to a NLRB regional office,
where it will be investigated and, hopefully, resolved without litigation. If not,
the regional director may assume the role of prosecutor, issuing a complaint if
he feels the claim is meritorious. A regional director's decision not to issue a
complaint is appealable to the General Counsel's Office, which has the ultimate,
prosecutorial authority, because its decision on the matter is nonreviewable. Vaca
The NLRB's third function, adjudication, is
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
carried out by administrative law judges and, on appeal, the Board itself. See
generally R. Gomw4A, supra note 2, and 7-9. On how this procedure applies to
deferral cases, see generally Pincus Bros., 620 F.2d at 385-86 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Truesdale, Is Spielberg Dead?, [1978] N.Y.U. CoNF. ON LAB. 47, 52.
note 195 infra (quoting Truesdale, supra).
63
Pincus Bros., 620 F.2d at 386 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
64

Id. 389.

65 Id. 390.
66 Id. 399.
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B. The Basis of Pincus Brothers
1. The Board's Failure to State Clearly its Current
Deferral Standards
The majority and concurring opinions in Pincus Brothers
agreed that the Board's refusal to defer had to be overturned. One
of the major rationales for this outcome was that the Board must
not be permitted to change its long-standing policies without formally announcing such changes. 67 Judge Rosenn stated that "[i]t is
our duty to see that the Board adheres to its established criteria
unless it clearly decides to modify or alter those standards." 68 Judge
Garth added that "the Board, like all agencies, is bound to adhere
to the regulations and decisions it announces." ID Judges Rosenn
and Garth do not object, then, to the fact that the Board has made
changes over the years in its deferral policy; 7o rather, their concern
stems from the method by which those changes presently are being
made. In Pincus Brothers, the NLRB claimed to have applied the
Spielberg7 1 standards, yet it acted in a manner that the court found
inconsistent with those standards. The Board, concluding that the
award was "clearly repugnant" to the Act, refused to defer, while
the majority and concurring judges concluded that the award could
be interpreted as complying with the Act.
The Pincus Brothers court exacted compliance with the Spielberg requirements by the use of its standard of appellate review: 72
671d. 372, 379-80. Both Judges Rosenn and Garth based this view in part
on two appellate decisions. In Hawaiian Hauling Service, Ltd. v. NLRB, 545
F.2d 674 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1976), the court stated:
The Board has established criteria to guide its decision and to this
extent self-imposed restraints limit its discretion. In reviewing the
Board, we must insure that it adheres to its own standards until they
are properly changed by the Board. We will not deny enforcement
unless the Board clearly departs from its own standards or its standards
are themselves invalid.
Id. 676. In NLRB v. Horn & Hardart Co., 439 F.2d 674, 679 (2d Cir. 1971),
the court commented that once the Board "announce[s] a policy regarding deference to arbitration, [it cannot] blithely ignore it, thereby leading astray litigants
who depended on it." See also St. Luke's Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 104
L.R.R.M. 2788, 2792 (5th Cir. May 21, 1980) (cautioning that the NLRB is
not "free to flout its own procedures").

68 620 F.2d at 372.
69 Id. 379 (emphasis in original).

70Indeed, Judge Garth commented that the Board is entitled to exercise
discretion in formulating deferral policy and that it "appears to change its policies

on deference with some regularity." Id. 380, 380 n.4.
71 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
72Recent court of appeals opinions in other circuits have required that the
Board follow the Spielberg standards in determining whether it should defer. See
District 1199E, Nat'l Union of Hosp. Employees v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1102 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (case remanded to Board to insure that it, having refused to defer
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it held that a Board refusal to defer constitutes an abuse of discretion "where the findings of the arbitrator may arguably be characterized as not inconsistent with Board policy." 73 Such a standard
makes it extremely difficult for the Board to refuse to uphold the
arbitrator's decision because under it the Board would have to "rule
out every arguable rationale for finding the employee's conduct
unprotected" 74 before it could decide that particular conduct violated the Act.
Strict compliance with Spielberg has not been required in all
of the courts of appeals. In NLRB v. Max Factor & Co., 75 the Ninth
Circuit, faced with facts simliar to those in Pincus Brothers,7 recently declined to follow the Third Circuit's rigorous application
of the "abuse of discretion" standard of review. 77 Instead, the court
recognized that the Board has "wide discretion" in its application
of the Spielberg standards, and that "enforcing the Act's protection
may be important enough to outweigh the interest in encouraging
arbitration, even in cases in which the conduct was 'arguably unprotected.' "78
to the arbitrator's award, gave appropriate consideration to the award); Douglas
Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352, 354 (9th Cir. 1979) (overturning Board's
refusal to defer, concluding that "[ilf the reasoning behind an award is susceptible
of two interpretations, one permissible, and one impermissible, it is simply not
true that the award was clearly repugnant to the Act"); NLRB v. Wilson Freight
Co., 604 F.2d 712, 722 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Smith v. Wilson
Freight Co., 445 U.S. 962 (1980) (Board refusal to defer and finding of section
8(a)(1) violation both reversed and arbitrator's award reinstated; the Board
could not, "in cavalier fashion," disregard arbitrator's award where "the record
so plainly reveals an objective cause for discharge"). These decisions have led
one commentator to suggest that the courts of appeals are concerned that the
NLRB is not giving arbitration awards the deference that Spielberg requires.
See Miller, The Board at the Turn of the Decade, [1980] 104 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 329, 330-31.
73 620 F.2d at 374. See notes 51-54 supra & accompanying text and note 60
supra.
74 NLRB v. Max Factor, 105 L.R.R.M. 2765, 2769 n.7 (9th Cir. Sept. 9,
1980). See notes 173-76 infra & accompanying text.
75 105 L.R.R.M. 2765 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 1980).
7
B Max Factor involved facts almost identical to those presented in Pincus
Brothers. Luisa Gratz, chief union steward at a Max Factor plant, was discharged
because of alleged low productivity and insubordination. Gratz filed charges
with the Board, and shortly thereafter grieved her dismissal under the collective
bargaining agreement, eventually taling her grievance to arbitration. Id. 2766.
An administrative law judge found that the employer's true motivations for the
discharge were unlawful under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.
Id. Shortly after this decision, an arbitrator held the dismissal valid under the
contract. His award did not consider Gratz's statutory claims. The NLRB refused to defer to the award, reasoning that deferral "would engender a result
repugnant to . ..the Act," and that the arbitrator had not "passed on" the unfair
labor practice aspects of the case. Id. 2767-68. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the NLRB solely on the former ground. Id. 2768 n.6.
77Id. 2769 n.7.
78 Id.
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2. The Erroneous Application of Judicial Deference Standards
to Board Deference Decisions
The Pincus Brothers court mistakenly equated the deference
that courts accord an arbitrator's award with the degree of deference
that the NLRB should accord such awards. Shortly after the
Board's decision in Spielberg, the Supreme Court, in the Steelworkers Trilogy,79 announced a standard of judicial review of arbitration awards. The Trilogy cases represented judicial recognition
of the utility of the arbitration process as a private method for resolving contract-governed labor disputes. The Court declared that
the policy favoring arbitration expressed in section 203(d) of the
LMRA s0 "can be effectuated only if the means chosen by the parties
for settlement of their differences under a collective bargaining
agreement is given full play." 81 To determine whether a party
should be required to arbitrate a particular dispute,
the judicial inquiry . . . must be strictly confined to the
question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate
the grievance . . . . An order to arbitrate the particular
grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dis82
pute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.
Once an arbitration award has been rendered, "doubts" as to its
validity are to be resolved in favor of affirmance. In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,3 the final case in the
Trilogy, the Court established the standard under which reviewing
courts should judge an arbitration decision: it should be upheld
"only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to
this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement
of the award." 84
The Trilogy standard of review should be invoked only when
an arbitrator's interpretation and application of a contract provision
79 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
8029 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976). See text accompanying note 24 supra.
81
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 566.
82
Warior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83 (emphasis added).

83 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
84

Id. 597.
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is challenged in a court. The Supreme Court has never required
that the decision of an arbitrator, "commissioned to interpret and
apply the collective bargaining agreement," 85 be accorded the deference of the Trilogy standard in situations that involve arbitral
interpretation of the NLRA. The arbitrator's competence has been
judicially recognized only in those instances in which he interprets
a contract, not in those in which he applies a statute.
Despite the existence in Pincus Brothers of both statutory and
contractual issues, Judge Rosenn seemed to rely on the Trilogy's
guidelines for the judicial review of contract-based arbitration
awards to ascertain the standard that the court would instructthrough the "abuse of discretion" mechanism-the Board to apply
in reviewing contract- and statute-based arbitration awards. Judge
Rosenn announced this standard after citing and discussing Ludwig
Honold Manufacturing Co. v. Fletcher,8 a Third Circuit decision
that relied upon the Trilogy to hold that courts are required to
uphold arbitration awards "so long as they are not in 'manifest
disregard' of the law." 87 Judge Rosenn's "arguably not inconsistent" formulation strongly resembles that found in Ludwig.
Under both, if the Board (or a court) can possibly interpret an arbitrator's award so that it is consistent with the Act, it must be upheld.
Because Ludwig is based on Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,8 8 the
standard announced in Pincus Brothers can be read as a misguided
attempt to apply the requirements of the Trilogy to the Board's
deferral policy.
The Pincus Brothers court's erroneous application of the
Trilogy standards stems more from the Board's prior inability to
resolve the deferral issue correctly than it does from the court's
seeming inability to grasp the nature of the problem in a "statutory"
rights case such as Pincus Brothers. In Spielberg,8 9 the Board failed
to recognize at the outset that arbitration awards addressing purely
contractual questions are entitled to a greater degree of deference
than those also involving statutory issues, and left the courts with
an incorrect guideline upon which to develop and apply their
standards of review. The Board in Spielberg adopted one formulation-"clearly repugnant"-to guide its deferral decisions, regardless
of the nature of the issues before the arbitrator. Judge Rosenn
85 Id.
86405 F.2d 1123 (3rd Cir. 1969).
871d. 1128.
88363 U.S. 593 (1960). See Ludwig, 405 F.2d at 1126-28.
89 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). See notes 20-32 supra & accompanying text.
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explicitly mentioned Spielberg as part of the foundation underlying his "arguably inconsistent" standardY0 The court's decisions
on review, then, are-as they should be-colored by the Board's decisions; unfortunately, those decisions in this area did not provide
the courts with a proper path to follow.
III. THE BOARD IN RETREAT FROM THE

Spielberg DOCTRINE

Notwithstanding the continued adherence to Spielberg by the
Third Circuit 91 and several other circuit courts, 2 the Board has
recently retreated from its policy of according a high degree of
deference to arbitral decisions 93 by substantially altering the nature
of its deferral doctrine with regard to both arbitration awards and
the arbitration process. It rarely defers to either anymore. This
doctrinal shift, which has led former Board Chairman Edward
Miller to speak in terms of the "memory of the now deceased
Collyer doctrine, and . . . the ailing, and failing Spielberg doctrine," 94 evidences a change in the nature of the Board's relationship to the arbitrator and the arbitration process.
A. Deferral Data
A survey9 5 of cases decided from 1977 through 1980 16 shows
that, although in at least seventy-one instances the Board had the
opportunity to dismiss an unfair labor practice complaint because
of the existence of an arbitration award involving the same conduct,
it chose to defer only thirteen times.9 7 When faced with the choice
of either deferring to an arbitrator's decision or reviewing the case
on its merits, then, the NLRB ignored the arbitrator's award about
eighty-two percent of the time. The figures for 1980 indicate that
9620 F.2d at 374. One Board member has clearly stated this. See Hammermill Paper Co., 252 NLRB No. 172 at 8 (Sept. 30, 1980) (Member Penello
dissenting) (equating the Spielberg standard for deferral with Judge Rosenn's
application of the abuse of discretion standard).

91NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980).
See note 72 supra.
93
See notes 95-123 & 128-36 infra & accompany text.
94
Miller, supra note 72, at 329.
95 This Comment's survey categorizes each deferral decision according to whether
it is a deferral to an arbitration award (Spielberg), see text accompanying notes 2022 supra, or to the arbitration process (Colgyer), see text accompanying notes 33-38
supra. See Appendix, Tables I & II, infra.
06This time period was chosen because 1977 marks the beginning of the
period in which the NLRB, through a series of decisions, significantly limited the
Spielberg and Collyer doctrines. See text accompanying notes 104-44 infra.
9
7 See Appendix, Table I, infra.
92
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the Board is continuing the practice of ignoring arbitration awards
in the great majority of cases. It considered deferral in twentythree cases, 98 yet chose to defer only five times. 99
The data on the declining incidence of "Collyer deferrals" to
the arbitration process 100 provide an even clearer illustration of the
98

See Appendix, Table I, infra.
99 Id. It is possible that the NLRE's retreat from Spielberg began before
1977. The statistics presented in Note, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration,
77 YALE L.J. 1191 (1968), indicate that during the period 1960-1964 the Board
deferred to arbitration in the unfair labor practice context 23.1% of the time (deferral in six of 26 cases). Id. 1219. During 1965-1967, however, the Board
deferred to arbitration in only 11.1% of the applicable cases (deferral two of 16
times). Id. 1220. While a comparison with the combined figures for the period
from 1977-1980 does not indicate a downward trend in the proportion of Board
deferrals-the combined deferral rate for the latter period is about 12% (15 of
127 cases), see Appendix, Table III, infra-the value of using the Yale data for
comparison purposes may well be negligible for at least two reasons.
First, the number of cases analyzed in the Yale Note was significantly lower
than the number that this Comment has compiled. It is possible that the simple
explanation is that many more requests for deferral have been presented to the
Board in the past few years than were presented to it in the mid-sixties. It is
also likely, however, that many cases were missed in the Yale survey because of
the deficient indexes provided by the NLRB at that time. The author of the
Note acknowledged this problem, which made "difficult an accurate and complete
classification of Board cases involving the possibility of deference to arbitration."
Note, supra, at 1219. The author also pointed to another such factor: "the Board
has, all too often, failed to state its reasoning with sufficient clarity to enable the
commentator to determine with confidence what, if any, weight is being given
to the existence, or possibility, of an arbitration award." Id. These factors
detracting from the earlier analysis-although present in this Comment's surveyhave probably not created a significant problem here, because better indexing,
computer scanning for key words (through Lexis), and more precise references
to the existence of an arbitration award have made it much easier to identify
almost all cases involving the possibility of deferral.
Another potential explanation for the static proportion of deferrals is that
there might have been an upswing in the number of deferrals granted after 1965,
which began to taper off around 1977. If the figure in the Yale Note is reasonably accurate, the NLRB has seen a dramatic increase in the number of cases in
which deferral is at issue since the 1965-1967 time period-from about three to
30 cases per year. Although this increase may have resulted from forces other
than those created by the Board itself, it seems likely that Board decisions of
the early 1970s contributed to the increased demand for deferrals. The holdings
in Collyer, see text accompanying notes 33-38 supra, and Electronic Reproduction
Service Corp., see text accompanying notes 133-36 infra, formally announced the
Board's increasingly favorable doctrinal slant toward deferral. Thus, it seems
possible that, although the Board announced its Spielberg standards in 1955, the
Board did not begin to favor significant use of the doctrine until the late 1960s,
and deliberately began to curtail its significance around 1977. See text accompanying notes 104-32 & 139-44 infra. Unfortunately, this Comment is unable to cite
any studies that contain the data either to confirm or refute empirically this
description of evolving Board attitudes toward arbitral deferral. The reader is
left with only two reasonably substantiated points to gather from this discussion:
the Board's decisions in the last few years appear as if they were designed to
decrease the number of deferrals from their pre-1977 levels, and statistics from the
most recent time period confirm that today the Board rarely defers to either an
arbitration award or the arbitration process.
100 Collyer Insulated Wire, A Gulf & Western Systems Co., 192 N.L.R.B.
837 (1971); see text accompanying notes 33-38 supra.
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Board's recent attitude toward deferral. From 1977 through 1980
the Board considered deferring an unfair labor practice complaint
to a contractual arbitration procedure fifty-six times; 101 it granted
deferral on only two occasions, both in 1977.102 Since the beginning
a complaint to an
of 1978, it has refused to remand, under Collyer,
10 8
cases.
consecutive
arbitrator in thirty-three
B. Legal Milestones in the Board's Retreat
Several recent NLRB decisions have significantly limited the
reach of both Spielberg'0 and Collyer.0 5 The Board's decision in
General American Transportation Corp.10 resulted in a sizable
cutback in the number of Board deferrals to the arbitration process.
The case involved an employee's claim that he had been discharged
for engaging in protected activity. The employer sought deference
to the contract remedy of arbitration, but the Board refused to
authorize a Collyer deferral. 0 7 While Members Fanning, Jenkins,
and Chairman Murphy all refused to defer, the analysis presented
in the Chairman's concurring opinion ' 8 had the greatest influence
on subsequent cases. 109
The Chairman distinguished disputes involving differences as
to the interpretation of a provision of a collective bargaining agreement,110 which should be determined by an arbitrator,"' from disputes involving employer interference with section 7 employee
rights, 1 2 which cannot be resolved conclusively through arbitradon.113 As stated by the Chairman, an employee's section 7 rights
1

'o

See Appendix, Table II, infra.

102 Id.

103 Id.
104 Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
105 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).

106228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
107 Id.
108 Id. 810.
109 See note 115 infra & accompanying text.

110 228 N.L.R.B. at 810 (Chairman Murphy concurring). She called these
contractual disputes "private rights" disputes, and defined private rights as "[r]ights
under a collective bargaining agreement . . . [that are] created by contract and
enforceable under procedures established by the contract for that purpose . . . .
Id. 813.
111Id. 810-11. The principal issue in these cases is usually whether certain
conduct is in derogation of the complainant's contractual rights. "Such suits are
eminently suited to the arbitral process ...." Id. 810.
112 NLBA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). See note 9 supra.
113 The Chairman referred to § 7 disputes as "public rights" controversies.
228 N.L.R.B. at 813 (Chairman Murphy concurring).
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"must be protected by the Board in its public capacity of giving
effect to the declared public policy of the Act." 114
This position has been adopted by the Board in other cases
holding that complaints alleging interference with employee section
7 rights may not be deferred to the arbitration process.11 5 Although
Chairman Murphy indicated that, where arbitration had been
entered into voluntarily by all parties, existing arbitration awards
being reviewed under Spielberg would not be affected by the
General American decision,"" the Board has since failed to clearly
resolve the question. It appears, however, that Spielberg is not
17
affected. "
The Spielberg "repugnancy" standard, previously interpreted
by the Board as requiring deferral to an award unless it is "palpably
wrong," 118 was substantially altered by its decision in The Kansas
City Star Co.1 9 Member Truesdale's concurring opinion states
that, in analyzing an award, the Board majority correctly examined
"the arbitrator's legal conclusion to see if, on the facts he has found,
it is consistent with Board law." 120 In a later case,' 2 1 Member
Truesdale further explained this view of the repugnancy requirement, stating that when "the arbitrator's legal conclusions are not
consistent with Board law . . . [they] are repugnant to the Act."

122

Requiring an arbitration award to be "consistent with Board law"
:14 Id.
115 See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co., 250 N.L.R.B. No. 89 (July 10, 1980);
Container Corp. of America, 244 N.L.R.B. No. 53 (August 17, 1979); Ackerman
Mfg. Co., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (March 30, 1979).
116228 N.L.R.B. at 812-13 (Chairman Murphy concurring).
117Compare Servair, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1278, 1278 n.1 (1978), rev'd, 102
L.R.R.M. 2705 (9th Cir. 1979), petition for reh. granted, No. 78-2791 (9th Cir.
1980), opinion withdrawn and remanded, 624 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1980) ("we find
it unnecessary to determine, in these circumstances, whether our decision in Spielberg . . . is in any way affected by our recent decision in General American
Transportation Corporation") with Gould, Inc. (Switcbgear Div.), 238 N.L.R.B.
No. 88 at 2, enforced, 105 L.R.R.M. 2788 (10th Cir. Oct. 7, 1980) (the Board,
in the course of refusing to defer to an arbitration award, states that this decision
does "not rely on General American Transportation Corporation... , inasmuch as
the arbitrator's award has already issued in this case"), and NLRB v. Max Factor
& Co., 105 L.R.R.M. 2765, 2767 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 1980) ("[allthough a majority
of the Board has rejected the Collyer policy of deferral to prospective arbitration,
at least as applied to individual rights cases under Sections 8(a)(1) and (3),
see General Am. Transp. Company [sic] . . . the Spielberg policy appears to remain
in effect") (footnotes omitted).
118 International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 929 (1962), enforced
sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
1003 (1964).
119 236 N.L.R.B. 866 (1978).
120 Id. 869 (emphasis added).

121 Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 1146 (1979).
122Id. 12 n.8 (Member Truesdale concurring).
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accords the award considerably less deference than would be the
case if the award needed only to meet the Spielberg "dearly repugnant" test before becoming final.1 23 The "consistent with Board
law" approach 3-2 enables the NLRB to substitute its decision for
that of the arbitrator 25 when the Board disagrees with the arbitrator.
Member Penello has been unwilling to accept this dilution of
the repugnancy requirement and, in a series of dissenting opinions,
has presented his view that the Board's current application of the
Spielberg doctrine is unfaithful to the case law in the area and is
unwise from a policy standpoint. 12 For example, he has asserted
that members of the Board majority
defer to an arbitration award only when they happen to
agree with the arbitrator's decision. This pretended application of the Spielberg doctrine effectively serves to oust
arbitrators of any real authority to issue final adjudications
to disputes over provisions in collective-bargaining agreements, since my colleagues in the majority have now assumed for themselves the role of final arbiter for the parties
over such matters. Thus, it is readily apparent that the
majority seeks to change the third Spielberg criteria from
"merely [sic] repugnant" to "merely erroneous," thereby
substituting their judgment for that of an arbitrator.127
123Id. 18 (Member
Penello dissenting) (stating that Member Truesdale's
"consistency standard [is a] much looser standard then the Spielberg 'dearly
repugnant' test.").

124 Although the NLRB has never explicitly overruled the repugnancy standard,
the finding that an arbitration award was inconsistent with Board law has been
accepted by the Board as a sufficient basis for a refusal to defer. See Atlantic
Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 107 at 5 (Sept. 28, 1979), in which the Board
based its decision to defer on Kansas City Star.
125 See text accompanying note 128 infra.

126Hammermill Paper Co., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 172 at 7 (Sept. 30, 1980)
(Member Penello dissenting); Babcock & Wilcox, 249 N.L.R.B. No. 99 at 10-11
n.9 (May 23, 1980) (Member Penello dissenting); Brown Co., 101 L.R.R.M.
1608, 1611 (NLRB July 30, 1979) (Members Penello and Murphy dissenting);
Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 1146, 1152 (1979) (Member Penello dissenting); Douglas Aircraft Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 578, 581 (1978) (Member Penello
dissenting), re'd, 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979); Clara Barton Terrace Convalescent Center, 225 N.L.R.B. 1028, 1031-32 (1976) (Members Penello and
Walther dissenting); Hawaiian Hauling Service, Ltd., 219 N.L.R.B. 765, 767
(1975) (Members Penello and Kennedy dissenting), enforced, 545 F.2d 674 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1976).
' 27Sea-Land Service, Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 1146, 1151 (1979).
Member
Penello reminded the majority that under a "clearly repugnant" standard a
Member should be bound to accept an award that is not clearly repugnant, even
if the Member would otherwise disagree with it. Id. 1151 n.19.
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The latest step in the Board's narrowing of the deferral doctrine came in the recent case of Suburban Motor Freight,Inc., 128 in
which the NLRB held that when an employee contends that his
discipline and/or discharge violated the Act, 1 29 the Board will not

defer to "an arbitration award [upholding the employer's action
under the contract] which bears no indication that the arbitrator
ruled on the statutory issue of discrimination in determining the
propriety of an employer's disciplinary actions." 130 The NLRB
will "no longer honor the results of an arbitration proceeding under
Spielberg unless the unfair labor practice issue before the Board
was both presented to and considered by the arbitrator." 131 Under
this formulation, the party seeking Board deferral to an arbitration
award has the burden of proving that all potential statutory issues
13 2
were adequately considered by the arbitrator.
An earlier decision, Electronic Reproduction Service Corp.,133
established that the Board would presume that the statutory issues
implicated in a discipline or discharge case had been presented to,
and decided by, the arbitrator "except when unusual circumstances
are shown which demonstrate that there were bona fide reasons . . .
which caused the failure to introduce such evidence at the arbitration proceeding." 134 Suburban Motor Freight reversed the Elec103 L.B.R.M. 1113 (NLRB Jan. 8, 1980).
129Violations of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act were alleged.
1114. See notes 6-13 supra & accompanying text.
128

Id.

130 103 L.R.R.M. at 1114.

131 Id. The effect of the presentation and consideration requirements is that
the Board "will give no deference to an arbitration award which bears no indication that the arbitrator ruled on the statutory issue. .. ." Id. For an example
of how these requirements have been applied, see General Warehouse Corp., 247
N.L.R.B. No. 142 (Feb. 14, 1980), in which the Board refused to defer to an
arbitration award that had upheld a discharge, on the grounds that the arbitrator did not consider evidence relevant to the protected activities engaged in by the
employee and the relationship of those activities to his termination. See also
Kahn's & Co., Div. of Consol. Food Co., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 4, (October 10, 1980);
Sachs Elec. Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 669 (1980).
132 Suburban Motor Freight, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1114.
N.L.R.B. 758 (1974).
134Id. 762 (footnote omitted).
133213

The basis of this rule was the Board's belief

that
the usual and normal practice of parties to collective agreements is to
submit to the arbitrator the central issue of the justness or unjustness of
the discipline or discharge and that it is the normal practice of the
parties to submit, and of arbitrators to consider as relevant . . . evidence
of unfairness or unjustness arising out of antiunion discrimination of the

type which we consider in cases arising under Section 8(a)(3) of our

Act.
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tronic Reproduction rule 185 and narrowed the circumstances under
136
which the Board will defer to an arbitration award.
The Suburban Motor Freight rule readjusts the erroneous
balance created in Electronic Reproduction between the statutory
mandates of section 203(d) of the LMRA 137 and section 10(a) of
the NLRA. 13 8 The Board explained that its deferral policy had to
be reevaluated in light of recent "experience":
Our experience with Electronic Reproduction has led to
the conclusion that it promotes the statutory purpose of
encouraging collective-bargaining relationships, but derogates the equally important purpose of protecting employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of
the Act....
The Board can no longer adhere to a doctrine which
forces employees in arbitration proceeding [sic] to seek
simultaneous vindication of private contractual rights and
public statutory rights, or risk waiving the latter. 139
In making this readjustment between the two statutory provisions,
Suburban Motor Freight essentially reinstated what had been the
Board's deferral policy prior to Electronic Reproduction. In Raytheon Co.,140 a 1963 decision, the Board refused to defer to an
arbitration award upholding a discharge because "the arbitrator
necessarily [as a result of the complainant's pleadings] addressed
himself, in making his award, solely to the contractual issue litigated
before him. . . . [H]e necessarily ignored the unfair labor practice now in issue before the Board." 141 In 1972, the Board formally
announced that no deference would be given to an arbitration
award bearing no indication that the statutory issues had been conSuburban Motor Freight, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1114.
The Electronic Reproduction rule had been severely criticized in both judicial
135

opinions and scholarly literature prior to its demise in the Suburban Motor Freight

decision. See, e.g., Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977); Schatzki,
Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers:
Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 897, 909 n.32 (1975);
Simon-Rose, Deferral Under Collyer by the NLRB of Section 8(a)(3) Cases, 27
LaB. L.J. 201, 209-12 (1976); 11 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 199, 220-22 (1977).
6

13 Miller, supra note 72, at 330.
1S 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976).
See text accompanying note 24 supra.
13829 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
See text accompanying note 23 supra.
The Board did not have to balance these two provisions at all, but has done
so ever since Spielberg. See text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
139 Suburban Motor Freight, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1114.
140140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963), enforcement denied on other grounds, 326 F.2d
471 (1st Cir. 1964).
141 Id. 884-86.

760

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 129:738

sidered 142 and that the burden to prove such consideration would
be on the party seeking deferral.1 43 Electronic Reproduction, then,
can be seen as an aberration from the Board's traditional policy of
trying to ensure adequate consideration of all unfair labor practice
claims.'"

C. "Adoption" of Arbitral Decisions
The Board's return to its policy of requiring proof of an arbitrator's consideration of statutory issues may have been inspired by
the Supreme Court's opinion in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co.14
Gardner-Denver held that an employee's Title VII-based
challenge to his discharge, 146 brought in federal district court, could
not be dismissed despite previous consideration of the claim in an
arbitration proceeding conducted in accordance with the applicable
collective-bargaining agreement. 47 The Board's analysis of the
deferral-to-arbitration doctrine in Suburban Motor Freight is similar to the Supreme Court's analysis of the issues in this Title VII
case.
The basis of the Court's decision is that the discharge of an
employee gives rise to issues surrounding both statutory and contractual rights. These rights are deemed independent of one another; the determination of the contractual right by the arbitrator
does not foreclose federal district court consideration of the statutory claim because the two rights spring from different sources-the
collective bargaining agreement as opposed to a federal statute. 4
The Court analogized this distinction to the roles played by an
342 Airco Industrial Gases-Pacific, A Division of Air Reduction Co., 195
N.L.R.B. 676 (1972).
143 Yourga Trucking, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 928 (1972).
144 Several recent appellate decisions also support the Board's current view
that deferral is inappropriate absent evidence that the arbitrator has satisfactorily
decided the statutory issues. See, e.g., Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 539
(9th Cir. 1977) ("the Board cannot abdicate its duty to consider unfair labor
practice charges by deferring when it has no lawful or reasonable basis for doing
so"); Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (NLRB deferral
to an arbitral tribunal will be upheld only if the tribunal "(A) clearly decided
the issue on which it is later urged that the Board should give deference, and
(B) the arbitral tribunal decided an issue within its competence.").
.45 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
:146
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1976 & Supp. II 1978). The employee in Gardner-Denverclaimed that his discharge was the result of racial discrimination.
147 415 U.S. at 42-43.
148 The Supreme Court stated that "a contractual right to submit a claim to
arbitration is not displaced simply because Congress also has provided a statutory
right against discrimination. Both rights have legally independent origins and are
equally available to the aggrieved employee." Id. 52.
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arbitrator and the NLRB in the adjudication of a grievance that
includes a statutory question:
The resulting scheme is somewhat analogous to the procedure under the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, where disputed transactions may implicate both
contractual and statutory rights. Where the statutory right
underlying a particular claim may not be abridged by
contractual agreement, the Court has recognized that consideration of the claim by the arbitrator as a contractual
dispute under the collective-bargaining agreement does not
preclude subsequent consideration of the claim by the
National Labor Relations Board as an unfair labor practice charge . . . . There, as here, the relationship between the forums is complementary since consideration of
the claim by both forums may promote the policies underlying each. 149
At least one judicial opinion, 15 a Board decision,' 51 and a
plethora of law review articles' 52 have discussed whether the
Gardner-Denver decision, arising under Title VII, should be applied to the NLRB's deferral policy. In Suburban Motor Freight,
the Board appears to have implicitly resolved the issue in favor of
its application because, after that decision, it appears that a discharge for "just cause" 153 will not foreclose NLRB adjudication of
a subsequent claim that the discharge violated the Act, unless either
of two conditions are met. First, if the facts as found by the
arbitrator and reviewed by the General Counsel show that the case
does not involve an unfair labor practice, 5 4 the General Counsel
will not issue a complaint.5 5 In this situation, the contractual right
("just cause") has been determined by the arbitrator-the Board has
'49

Id. 50-51 (footnotes & citations omitted).

150 Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 538 n.4, 539 (9th Cir. 1977).

151 Electronic Reproduction Service Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 762-64 (1974).
See, e.g., Getman, Can Collyer and Gardner-Denver Co. Co-Exist? A Postscript, 49 IND. LJ. 285 (1974) (Gardner-Denver is applicable); Nash, Board
Referral to Arbitration and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver: Some Preliminary Observations, 25 LAB. L.J. 259 (1974) (Gardner-Denver is not applicable); SimonRose, supra note 135 (background discussion of issues involved); Note, Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver and Deferral to Labor Arbitration, 27 HAs=nGs LJ. 403, 425
(1975) (Gardner-Denver is not applicable); Note, NLRB Deferral of Section
8(a)(5) Refusal to Bargain Cases to Arbitration, 20 ST. Louis U. L.J. 489, 503-06
(1976) (Gardner-Denver is applicable); 88 HAav. L. REv. 804, 809-11 (1975)
(Gardner-Denver is applicable).
1-3 See note 3 supra.
54
'
For example, a case in which an employee was fired for wholly legitimate
reasons, such as low productivity, high absenteeism, or poor work quality.
155 On the General Counsel's role, see note 62 supra.
152
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no authority to review this issue-' 5 6 and the General Counsel has
decided that no statutory issue exists. Second, the NLRB will dismiss the case if the arbitrator has been presented with and considered the unfair labor practice issue and has resolved it in a
manner consistent with the way in which the Board would have
decided such a question.157 The Board no longer grants the type
of deference contemplated in Spielberg, under which arbitration
decisions foreclose subsequent Board adjudication unless they are
"clearly repugnant" to the policies of the NLRA implicated by the
underlying conduct being complained of.
Rather, it shows real deference to an arbitrator only in the type
of situation envisioned by the Supreme Court in Gardner-Denver
for district court deferral to arbitration: where the arbitrator is
competent to decide the issues for which deference is being sought. 15
Because an arbitrator is not empowered by statute to enforce the
important statutory rights stemming from the NLRA-just as he
cannot enforce Title VII rights-the Board will defer to his decision
involving statutory rights only when it agrees with the decision.
This new policy places the arbitration award in a very different
role than the one it played under the original Spielberg formulation. By deciding that it will defer to an arbitration award only
when "the award is in accord with the Act and Board precedent," 159
the Board is demonstrating that the arbitrator is not a substitute for
itself, but is instead more akin to an "unofficial administrative law
judge," 160 whose decisions the Board is not bound to accept. When
the Board does defer to an arbitration award, it is "adopting" the
arbitrator's conclusion as its own, rather than deferring to his judgment.161 In effect, the NLRB is deciding unfair labor practice
complaints through the medium of an arbitration award.
IV. THE QUESTION OF JUDICIAL REviEw:

Pincus Brothers

The standard used by the Pincus Brothers 162 court for the
review of Board refusals to defer to arbitration awards-that the
156 The NLRA gives no affirmative authority to the Board over purely contractual disputes, and the LMRA encourages the resolution of such disputes through
arbitration whenever possible. See text accompanying notes 23 & 24 supra.
57
1 See notes 119-25 supra & accompanying text.
158 415 U.S. at 53-54.
159 Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 107 at 13 (Sept. 28, 1979) (Member
Penello concurring).
160 Id. See note 47 supra.
161 245 N.L.R.B. No. 107 at 13 (Member Penello concurring).
162 NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980).
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Board's decision not to defer will be .overturned as an abuse of discretion if the award is "arguably . . .not inconsistent with Board
policy"-1 63 requires that the NLRB follow its deferral policy as announced in Spielberg.'6 Under the Pincus Brothers standard, the
Board will be hard-pressed in the Third Circuit to justify its refusals to defer.1es
One root of the Third Circuit's reluctance to allow the Board
to abandon deferral in the Spielberg tradition is the "national policy
in favor of labor arbitration." 160 Arbitration has been praised by
both Congress '0 7 and the Supreme Court. 6" Commentators have
pointed out that it allows for the settlement of disputes efficiently,
non-violently, and without the invention of any governmental
body. 6 9 When operating within its sphere of competency, it
achieves the goals for which all systems of dispute resolution strive:
finality, neutrality, guidance, and obedience.' 7 0
Although the voluntary adjustment of contractual labor disputes is a worthwhile objective for the Board and courts to pursue,
the Board has a right and, indeed, a responsibility to adjudicate
statutory disputes.' 7 ' In Spielberg, the Board mistakenly endorsed
the policy of allowing private tribunals to decide issues involving
statutory rights so long as the resulting awards were not "dearly
repugnant" to the Act; recent Board decisions recognize the dangers
in not taking a more active role in reviewing arbitral decisions
affecting statutory rights.'7 2 In NLRB v. Max Factor & Co.,' 7 3 the
163 Id. 374.
164 Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
accompanying
text.
65

See notes 20-32 supra &

'
See NLRB v. Max Factor & Co., 105 L.R.R.M. 2765, 2769 n.7 (9th Cir.
Sept. 9, 1980).
166 Pincus Brothers, 620 F.2d at 374. See notes 39-88 supra & accompanying

text.

7
16
See LMRA §203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976).

See text accompanying

note 24 supra.
168 See, e.g., Carey v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964)

(referring to the "therapy of arbitration"); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (discussing the arbitrator's special
"competence" for determining contractual grievances); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960) (labelling arbitrators
"indispensable agencies in a continuous collective bargaining process").
169 See, e.g., F. Erxouns & E. ELxouRI, How AiBrraA-nON WonKs 8-10 (3rd

ed. 1974); Hepburn & Loiseaux, The Nature of the Arbitration Process, 10 VAN,.
L. REv.0 657 (1957).
17 See Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YAIx LJ.
916 (1979). The value of the arbitration process, however, is not universally
accepted. See P. HAYs, LABoR AmrrATIoN: A DissE-meG Vmw (1966).
171 See notes 6-13 & 23-27 supra & accompanying text.
172 See notes 137-43 supra & accompanying text.
173 105 L.R.R.M. 2765 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 1980).
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Ninth Circuit expressly repudiated the Pincus Brothers standard 174
and sanctioned a more active role for the Board. Under the Ninth
Circuit's approach, if the Board finds that the arbitrator's result is
not "appropriate under the Act," and that "the interest in affording
the Act's protection is so compelling under the circumstances that
it outweighs the interest in encouraging private resolution of disputes through arbitration," the Board may refuse to defer on the
ground that the award is "clearly repugnant to the Act." 175
The importance of a court giving the NLRB the flexibility to
refuse to defer to an award that is only "inconsistent" with the
policies of the NLRA cannot be understated. A strict application
of the deferral policies enunciated in Spielberg, as extended by
ElectronicReproduction,7 6 reduces the statutory protections of employees and employers because it leaves the determination of statutory rights to a private arbitral tribunal devoid of public policy
responsibilities. Unlike the private arbitrator, the Board is required to serve the public interest.177 The Second Circuit, in
174Id.
75

2769 n.7. See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.

105 L.R.R.M. at 2769.

While the Max Factor decision does give the NLRB a degree of needed
flexibility in deciding how to treat an arbitration award, it should be noted that
the Ninth Circuit has made some of the same analytic errors that have characterized court and NLRB decisions in this area. First, the court perceived a
statutory conflict where none exists. The court incorrectly stated that, in order
to resolve the issue of when the Board should defer to an arbitration award, the
court must reconcile "two important policies which are in tension: the policy
favoring the exercise of jurisdiction by the Board to prevent unfair labor practices
and the policy favoring the 'settling of labor disputes by arbitration."' 105
L.R.R.M. at 2767 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960)). These two policies, however, are complementary,
and any tension between them is imaginary. See notes 23-26 & 145-49 supra &
accompanying text.
Second, the Max Factor court adopted a very uncertain guideline for determining when deference is appropriate: when "the interest in affording the
Act's protection is so compelling under the circumstances that it outweighs the
interest in encouraging private resolution of disputes through arbitration." Id.
2769. That formulation, which the Board is supposed to be able to use in deciding
the large number of deferral cases brought before it each year, is even more
ambiguous than the "clearly repugnant" standard. The Max Factor standard requires a balancing of interests, but provides no guidance on how to go about that
balancing. The Board's current deferral practice utilizes a more definitive standard:
it is based on a comparison of the arbitrator's treatment of the relevant statutory
questions with the NLRB's history of dealing with those questions. See notes 10444 supra & accompanying text.
176Electronic Reproduction Service Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974). See
notes 133-39 supra & accompanying text. Prior to Max Factor, the Ninth Circuit
had rejected the deferral practice established in Electronic Reproduction "as it
permits the Board to base its deference upon mere presumption in total absence
of any evidence." Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 541 (9th Cir. 1977).
177NLRA §1(b), 29 U.S.C. §141(b) (1976), provides in part: "It is the
purpose and policy of this chapter . . . to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce."

-1981]

NLRB STANDARDS ON ARBITRAL DEFERRALS

NLRB v. Horn & Hardart Co., 178 has examined this functional
-difference between the NLRB and arbitrators:
The National Labor Relations Act guarantees certain
rights to employees, employers . . . and the public, and
the Board is charged with protecting these interests. An
arbitrator is not. His function is to discern the intention
of the parties to a contract, who have hired him to resolve
their differences. The interests of third parties, such as an
individual employee, a group179of employees or the public,
are not his primary concern.
Cognizant of these concerns, the Board's present deferral policy
correctly requires that the arbitrator decide the statutory issues in
the case in a manner consistent with Board precedent on those
issues.180 Given the nature of the Board's statutory responsibility,
the standard established in Pincus Brothers for review of NLRB
refusals to defer to arbitration awards is inappropriate.
V. PRoPosAis FOR THE FUTURE
Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Board has restricted
its support of arbitration awards by limiting the circumstances
under which it will defer to them. The Pincus Brothers's' panel
sought to inhibit this trend by applying the traditional "abuse of
discretion" standard of review in a way that virtually requires the
NLRB to dismiss complaints implicating conduct that has been
the subject of a prior arbitration award. This application should
be modified, because it results in the loss of a considerable degree
of Board protection of NLRA rights. However, this shift in the
appellate review of Board deferred decisions should be presaged by
The Second Circuit upheld in this case
178 439 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1971).
an NLRB refusal to defer.
This view has been stated even more strongly by Members
179 Id. 678.
Fanning and Jenkins, concurring in Electronic Reproduction Service Corp.:
Arbitration is essentially alien to determination of public rights.
Arbitrators have no expertise in the interpretation of the Act. The Board
does. The arbitrator is bound to give effect to the collective-bargaining
agreement, whatever might be its inconsistency with the law. And public
rights cannot be left unvindicated, if the Act is to afford equal protection

and uniform application.
213 N.L.R.B. 758, 765 (1974). See also Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535,
539 n.6 (9th Cir. 1977). Cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57
(1974) (comparison of the relative abilities of an arbitrator and a federal district
court to decide statutory questions arising under Title VII).
180 See notes 119-44 supra & accompanying text.
181 NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxvell, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980).
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a change in the way that the Board itself formally defines 82 its
policy on arbitration awards adjudging conduct that is claimed to,
violate the NLRA. 88
A. The National Labor Relations Board
Recently, the Board has implicitly redefined the concepts of
"deferral" and "repugnancy." 184 Unless it now clearly articulates
those changes, reviewing courts cannot be expected to adopt more
responsive standards of review. 8 5 The impetus for this "announcement" must come from the Board itself, because the courts of appeals have traditionally been unsuccessful in forcing the Board to
clarify its policies when they appear inconsistent with past Board
precedent. 8 6
The policy shift that this Comment suggests the Board formally
announce is substantial. Although the NLRB has been claiming.
to follow a policy of deferral to arbitration for over twenty-five
years, 87 deferral presently bears only a remote resemblance to deferral in years past. The Board should explicitly state that it will
now defer to an award only when the arbitrator has considered all
statutory issues involved and has resolved them the same way that
the Board would have had it heard the case de novo. An arbitrator's award is no longer given deference when it is a plausible
182-The Board has never formally overruled any of the Spielberg criteria, so,
it has not actually admitted that it is modifying the "clearly repugnant" standard.

One must look to the practical effects of its decisions and Member Truesdale's
concurring opinions.

See notes 118-22 supra & accompanying text.

18 3It is well-settled that, apart from formal rulemaking proceedings, the

Board can adopt or revise policies while engaged in the process of adjudication.
See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974); NLRB v. WymanGordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765-66 (1969). Cf. Shapiro, The Choice of Rule-

making or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HAqv.
L. REv. 921, 947-52 (1965) (suggesting that decisionmaking may believe that
their agency is freer to depart from prior policies established through adjudication
than from policies established through formal rulemaking).
184 See text accompanying notes 119-61 supra.
185 As discussed above, however, see text accompanying notes 173-75 supra,
the Ninth Circuit has adopted a more flexible stance in spite of the NLRB's
unwillingness to articulate its current policy.

L.R.R.M. 2765 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 1980).

NLRB v. Max Factor & Co., 105

186 An example of the inability of the courts to force NLRB policy clarifica-

tions is provided by the subsequent history of NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Local 50, 504 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975).
There, the court sought to require the Board to clarify its principles in the confused area of work jurisdictional disputes under § 10(k) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(k) (1976). The NLRB flatly refused to obey the court's directive. See
International Longshoremen's Local 50, 223 N.L.R.B. 1034 (1976).
187 Spielberg, 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955), was decided on June 8, 1955.
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result-it must be the Board's result. This policy is more akin to
the "adoption" of arbitral decisions than it is to arbitral deferral, 188
and this distinction should be made clear by the Board.
The NLRB did present portions of this analysis in Suburban
Motor Freight,8 9 but its statements on deferral did not go far
.enough. Although the Board stated that it would "no longer honor
the results of an arbitration proceeding under Spielberg unless the
unfair labor practice issue was both presented to and considered by
the arbitrator," 190 it should also have stated the conditions under
which it would affirm the arbitration results. As stated above, to
accurately define its new deferral practice, the NLRB should explicitly state that it no longer applies the Spielberg "clearly repugnant" criterion, 191 and that it does follow a "consistent with
Board law" requirement. Apart from that, however, the other
Spielberg requirements, that all parties to the dispute agree to be
bound to the arbitrator's decision, and that the proceedings be "fair
and regular," 192 should remain intact. The Board has given no
indications that it wishes to abandon or redefine either of those,
requirements. The word "deferral" should be dropped from the
Board's vocabulary in this area, to be replaced by either "arbitral
postponement" or "arbitral adoption."
Under this policy, the Board would have reached the same
decision that it did reach in Pincus Brothers, but would have stated
the basis for the decision more accurately. It would have found the
arbitrator's award "inconsistent" with the Act, rather than "clearly
repugnant," on the grounds that the arbitrator's resolution of the
statutory questions in the case was not consistent with the Board's
reading of the applicable law. The Board would then have refused
to "adopt" the award and would have decided the case itself. This
new terminology should have little, if any, actual effect on Board
decisions-it is simply a clearer way of describing what the Board
has been doing for the past several years. It should be emphasized
that this "new" Board policy by no means robs arbitration proceedings of their significance. The arbitration process continues to
serve several important functions. First, it can be used to resolve
most unfair labor practice cases that are based wholly on the inter188 See text accompanying notes 145-61 supra.
189 103 L.R.R.M. 1113 (NLRB Jan. 8, 1980).
190

Id. 1114.

191 Spielberg, 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
192

Id.
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pretation of contractual language.193 In such disputes, the arbitrator's award should be given a great deal of deference because,
"[w]here the question of unfair labor practice depends on contract
interpretation, the expertise of arbitrators . . . is held to be superior

to that of the Board which primarily considers the statutory
issues." 194
Second, arbitration can be used to settle those cases in which
the employee's statutory claim is frivolous. Employees fired for
cause will not be able to use the Board as a second forum in which
to seek reinstatement, because the General Counsel will not issue a
complaint where the statutory claim lacks merit.1' 5
Finally, the arbitrator's award serves two possible purposes
when the grievance involves substantial statutory questions. First,
where the arbitrator has considered and decided the statutory issues
in a manner consistent with NLRB law, the Board will simply
affirm the award as the decision in the case. Second, even where
the arbitrator has not resolved the statutory questions, or the Board
does not agree with his legal conclusions, it can still use the facts
as found by the arbitrator and stated in his award as the record in
the case. This record, supplemented by the briefs of counsel, can
provide the basis upon which to decide the case.
B. The Courts of Appeals
The change in stated NLRB policy would have a more marked
effect on the courts of appeals than on the Board. The policy shift
would inform the courts that they should no longer apply their
standards of review in a way that, in effect, obligates the Board to
defer to arbitration awards that do not adequately resolve the statutory issues in a given case. Reviewing courts would not require the
93

1 The typical example of this type of dispute is the complaint alleging that
an employer has taken unilateral action on an issue that is the subject of mandatory
bargaining under the Act, with the response being that the collective bargaining

agreement permits such action.

See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.

194 Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 538 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977).
195 The procedure under which the General Counsel and the NLRB review

arbitration awards was recently discussed by Member John Truesdale:
[T]he bifurcated nature of the NLRB . . . [means that] an independent

General Counsel acts as the prosecutorial arm and decides whether to
issue a complaint or dismiss a charge by applying precedents decided by
the five-member Board. Thus, the only cases in which the Board can
defer are those in which the General Counsel has concluded, in the precomplaint stage, that the Spielberg criteria have not been met. When
such a case gets before the Board, the Board is not, of course, bound
by the General Counsel's determination that deferral under Spielberg is not
warranted. It is not surprising, however, that the Board more often
than not reaches a similar conclusion.

Truesdale, supra note 62, at 52 (emphasis in original).
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type of "fit" between the arbitrator's award and the Spielberg
criteria that Pincus Brothers demands before upholding the Board's
decision not to defer. By requiring NLRB deferral to awards that
are "arguably . . . not inconsistent" with the Act, Pincus Brothers

gives greater deference to arbitrators than it gives to the Board. 9
Under the standard of review that this Comment proposes, however,
the Board would be afforded the deference it deserves as the agency
charged with enforcing the NLRA. In applying the Act to the
facts of a given case, as found by the arbitrator, the Board will be
allowed the broad margin of error that the Third Circuit standard
now allows the arbitrator.
A Seventh Circuit's panel's decision in St. Luke's Memorial
Hospital, Inc. v. NLRB 17 exemplifies the proper role that a court
should play in reviewing NLRB refusals to defer. In that case,
three hospital employees were discharged for leading a brief, unauthorized walkout. An arbitrator's award upheld the discharges,
but the Board refused to defer to it on the grounds that the award
-was, inter alia, repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act. 198
The court affirmed this ruling, finding that "the arbitrator's award
is arguably repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act." 199
The "arguably repugnant" standard gives the Board the leeway it
needs to enforce the NLRA effectively. Had it been applied in
Pincus Brothers, the Board's decision not to defer would have been
affirmed. Because the arbitrator's award in Pincus Brothers was
arguably not inconsistent with the Act, it was also arguably inconsistent with-or repugnant to-it. Therefore, it seems reasonable to
assume that the St. Luke's panel would have applied its "arguably
repugnant" standard to uphold the Board's decision. If so, it should
be remembered that the court would have simply been shifting the
allowable margin of error in applying the Act from one authority
to another. By allowing the Board to overturn an award because it
arguably violates the Act, rather than allowing the award to stand
because it is arguably reconcilable with it, a court recognizes the
scope of the responsibility that is entrusted to the NLRB-the maintenance of labor-management peace and stability through the fair
administration of the National Labor Relations Act.
' 9 6By

forcing the NLRB to accept an arbitrator's decision on a statutory

issue unless there is no way to square that decision with the Act, 620 F.2d at 374,
the Third Circuit is giving all of the discretion in deciding the case to the arbitrator. See notes 72-78 supra & accompanying text.
'97623

F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1980).

Id. 1177.
199 Id. 1178 (emphasis added).
198
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CONCLUSION

The NLRB spent twenty-two years, from 1955 through 1977,developing an unneeded policy on deferral to arbitration awards.
It has spent the last three years attempting to circumscribe that
policy. Although it can be faulted for waiting so long to undertake
this revision, and for failing to adequately articulate the changes ithas made, the wisdom of its new approach seems readily apparent.
The NLRB, not privately-selected arbitrators, should be able todetermine conclusively whether conduct runs afoul of the NLRA,
because it is the public authority charged with administering the
statute. The deferral policy designed in the Steelworkers Trilogy
may contain the correct standards for the judicial review of contractual arbitration awards, but courts should not apply those
guidelines to the Board's review of arbitration awards involving
statutory-rights issues, as the Third Circuit apparently did in Pincus
Brothers. To do so impairs the Board's ability to overturn the
results of arbitration proceedings that have not properly considered
those issues. The court should apply standards of review that foster,
rather than frustrate, the protection of statutory rights.
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NLRB STANDARDS ON ARBITRAL DEFERRALS
APPENDIX
TABIz I
DEFERENCE TO APwrrR noN

Year
1977
1978
1979
1980
ToTAL

Awmnns UNER Spielberg: 1977-1980

No. of Cases
in Which the
NLRB Deferred
21
23
45
57
13

No. of Cases
in Which the
NLRB Did Not
Defer
102
184
126
188
58

Percentage
of Cases in
Which the NLRB
Deferred
16.7%
10.0

25.0
21.7
18.3

1United Parcel Serv., Inc. 232 N.L.R.B. 1114 (1977), enforced sub nom.
Bloom v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Jack Hodge Transport, Inc.,
227 N.L.R.B. 1482 (1977).
2
Gimbel Bros., Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 1235 (1977); Ford Motor Co., 233
N.L.R.B. 698 (1977); General Motors Corp. (Inland Div.), 233 N.L.R.B. 47
(1977), enforced, 616 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1980); United Stanford Employees,
Local 680, 232 N.L.R.B. 326 (1977), enforced, 601 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1979);
Owners Maintenance Corp., 232 N.L.R.B. 100 (1977), enforced, 581 F.2d 44
(2d Cir. 1978); Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 757 (1977), enforced, 587
F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978); Super Valu Xenia, 228 N.L.R.B. 1254 (1977); Chrysler
Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 486 (1977); Filmation Associates, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1721
(1977); Versi Craft Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 877 (1977).
3 The Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866 (1978); Lorain Div. of Koehring
Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1978).
4
Max Factor & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 804 (1978), enforced, 105 L.R.R.M. 2765
(9th Cir. Sept. 9, 1980); American Cyanamid Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 440 (1978); Ad
Art, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 159 (Sept. 29, 1978), enforced, 106 L.R.R.M. 2010 (9th
Cir. Dec. 9, 1980); Gould, Inc. (Switchgear Div.), 238 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (Sept. 28,
1978), enforced, 105 L.R.R.M. 2788 (10th Cir. Oct. 7, 1980); Greif Bros. Corp., 238
N.L.R.B. No. 30 (Sept. 20, 1978); District 1199E, Nat'l Union of Hosp. and Health
Care Employees, 238 N.L.R.B. No. 8 (Sept. 7, 1978), -e'd and remanded, 613 F.2d
1102 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 237 N.L.R.B. 1063 (1978),
enforcement denied, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980); Davol, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 431
(1978), enforced, 597 F.2d 782 (1st Cir. 1979); The Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc.,
237 N.L.R.B. 6 (1978); Servair, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1278 (1978), tvnd, 102
L.R.R.M. 2705 (9th Cir. 1979), petition for reh. granted, No. 78-2791 (9th Cir.
1980), opinion withdrawn and remanded, 624 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1980); Brewery
Delivery Employees Local 46, 236 N.L.R.B. 1175 (1978); Owens Coming Fiberglas
Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 479 (1978); Retail Clerks Local 324, 235 N.L.R.B. 711 (1978);
T & T Industries, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 517 (1978); Wilson Freight Co., 234 N.L.R.B.
844 (1978), reed, 604 F.2d 712 (1st Cir. 1979); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.,
234 N.L.R.B. 588 (1978); Douglas Aircraft Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 578 (1978), Teaid,
609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979); United Parcel Serv., Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 483 (1978),
enforcement denied, 104 L.R.R.M. 2612 (6th Cir. Oct. 12, 1979).
5
Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 107 (Sept. 28, 1979); Pacific South-west Airlines, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. No. 151 (June 14, 1979); United States Postal
Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 192 (May 3, 1979); Arnold Junior Fenton, Inc., 240
N.L.R.B. 202 (1979).
6 United Steelworkers Local 7450 (Asarco, Inc.), 246 N.L.R.B. No. 139
(Dec. 7, 1979); M & B Contracting Corp., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 155 (Sept. 28,
1979); United States Postal Serv., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 115 (Sept. 28, 1979); Triple
A Machine Shop, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (Sept. 21, 1979); Brown Co., 243
N.L.R.B. No. 100 (July 30, 1979); Monteflore Hosp. and Medical Center, 243
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TABLE II
DEFERENCE TO

=HE ARBrrAnON PaocEss UNDER

No. of Cases

1977
1978
1979
1980
To.L

in Which the
NLRB Deferred
21
0
0
0
2

No. of Cases
in Which the

Collyer: 1977-1980

NLRB Did Not
Defer
212
143
154
45
54

Percentage
of Cases in

Which the NLRB
Deferred
8.7%
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.7

N.L.R.B. No. 106 (July 25, 1979), rev'd in part on other grounds, 621 F.2d
510 (2d Cir. 1980); The Union Fork and Hoe Co., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 140 (April
17, 1979); Grane Trucking Co., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 19 (March 16, 1979); Oakland
Scavenger Co., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (March 15, 1979); Saint Luke's Memorial
Hosp., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 1180 (1979), enforced, 623 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1980);
Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 1146 (1979); Varied Enterprises, Inc., 240
N.L.R.B. 126 (1979).
7 Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. No. 146 (Aug. 27, 1980);
Gen. Tel. Co. of Mich., 251 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Aug. 27, 1980); Bay Shipbuilding
Corp., 251 N.L.R.B. No. 114 (Aug. 27, 1980); Botany 500, A Div. of RapidAmerican Menswear, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (Aug. 26, 1980); Am. Bakeries
Co., 249 N.L.R.B. No. 170 (June 13, 1980).
8
Pacemaker Yacht Co., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 95 (Dec. 18, 1980); Russ Togs,
Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Dec. 15, 1980); Aeronca, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 26
(Nov. 12, 1980); B & L Motor Freight, Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (Oct. 27,
1980); Kahn's and Co., Div. of Consol. Food Co., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (Oct. 10,
1980); The Motor Convoy, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 175 (Sept. 30, 1980); Hammermill Paper Co., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 172 (Sept. 30, 1980); United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
252 N.L.R.B. No. 145 (Sept. 30, 1980); Herman Bros., Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No.
121 (Sept. 30, 1980); Albertsons, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. No. 81 (Sept. 29, 1980);
Koppel, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. No. 96 (Aug. 26, 1980); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 249
N.L.R.B. No. 99 (May 23, 1980); Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 249 N.L.R.B. No.
51 (May 14, 1980); Colonial Stores, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1980); Sachs Elec.
Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 669 (1980); Pioneer Finishing Corp., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 182
(Feb. 21, 1980); General Warehouse Corp., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 142 (Feb. 14,
1980); Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 103 L.R.R.M. 113 (NLRB Jan. 8, 1980).
'Croation Fraternal Union, 232 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1977); Roy Robinson, Inc.,
228 N.L.R.B. 828 (1977).
2
Timpte, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1977), enforcement denied, 590 F.2d 871
(10th Cir. 1979); Saint Joseph's Hosp., 233 N.L.R.B. 1116 (1977); Texaco, Inc.,
233 N.L.R.B. 375 (1977); McLean Trucking Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 706 (1977), vacated, 626 F.2d 1168 (4th Cir. 1980); C & H Tire Serv., Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 1173
(1977); Marion Power Shovel Co., Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 576 (1977); Northeast
Oklahoma City Mfg. Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 135 (1977), enforced, 631 F.2d 669 (1980);
Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local 367, 230 N.L.R.B. 86 (1977), enforced, 99
L.R.R.M. 2633 (3d Cir. June 21, 1978); Yellow Cab Co., 229 N.L.R.B. 1329 (1977),
modified, 603 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Sahara-Tahoe Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1094
(1977), enforced, 581 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1978); Columbus Foundries, Inc., 229
N.L.R.B. 34 (1977), enforced, No. 77-2012 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 1978); United States
Postal Serv., 228 N.L.R.B. 1235 (1977); Fairfield Nursing Home, 228 N.L.R.B. 1208
(1977); United Parcel Serv., 228 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1977), rev'd, Kohls v. NLRB,
104 L.R.R.M. 3049 (D.C. Cir. July 18, 1980); Sioux Quality Packers, 228 N.L.R.B.
1034 (1977); General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977); Ram Construction Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 769 (1977), enforced, 99 L.R.R.M 2633 (3d Cir.
Dec. 5, 1977); Western Mass. Elec. Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 607 (1977), enforced as
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DEFEnENCE TO AnBITRA-TION

1977
1978
1979
1980
TOTAL

AwAms AND

No. of Cases
in Which the
NLRB Deferred
41
23
45
57
15

m
nm APrrAnoN PNocEss: 1977-1980
No. of Cases
in Which the
NLRB Did Not
Defer
312
324
276
228
112

Percentage
of Cases in
Which the NLBB
Deferred
11.4%
5.9
12.9
18.5
11.8

modified, 573 F.2d 101 (Ist Cir. 1978); Cincinnati Bell, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 193G
(1977); Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1829 (1977); International Union of Operating Engineers, 227 N.L.R.B. 1477 (1977).
3Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 840 (1978); W-I Canteen Serv., Inc.,
238 N.L.R.B. No. 87 (Sept. 28, 1978), enforcement denied, 608 F.2d 738 (7th
Cir. 1979); New York Typographical Union No. 6, 237 N.L.R.B. 1241 (1978);
Triangle Sheet Metal Works, 237 N.L.R.B. 364 (1978); United States Postal
Serv., 237 N.L.R.B. 117 (1978); Meharry Medical College, 236 N.L.R.B. 1396
(1978); Brewery Delivery Employees, Local 46, 236 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1978); Safeway Stores, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1126 (1978), enforced, 622 F.2d 425 (9th Cir.
1980); Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978), enforced,
602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979); Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 235 N.L.R.B.
572 (1978); Loomis Courier Serv., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 534 (1978), retvd on other
grounds, 595 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1979); Milgram Food Stores, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B.
1 (1978); Helvetia Sugar Cooperative, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 638 (1978); National
Rejectors Indus., 234 N.L.R.B. 251 (1978).
4
Native Textiles, 246 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (Oct. 24, 1979); Struthers Wells Corp.,
245 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (Sept. 28, 1979); Union Boiler Co., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 93
(Sept. 28, 1979); Lewis Mittman, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (Sept. 27, 1979);
Amcar Div., ACF Indus., Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 53 (Sept. 25, 1979); Southern
Fla. Hotel & Motel Ass'n, 245 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (Sept. 28, 1979); Precision Anodizing & Plating, Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. No. 135 (Sept. 5, 1979); Garrett R.R. Car &
Equip., Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. No. 132 (Sept. 5, 1979); Kansas City Power & Light
Co., 244 N.L.R.B. No. 93 (Aug. 24, 1979); Container Corp. of Am., 244 N.L.R.B.
No. 53 (Aug. 17, 1979); Wallace Metal Products, Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. No. 10
(Aug. 9, 1979); Southern Cal. Edison Co., 243 N.L.R.B. No. 62 (July 10, 1979);
Ackerman Mfg. Co., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (March 30, 1979); International Harvester Co., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 94 (March 29, 1979); Melones Contractors, 241
N.L.R.B. No. 3 (March 15, 1979).
5 Consolidation Coal Co., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 104 (Dec. 15, 1980); Interlake,
Inc., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (Dec. 9, 1980); International Bhd. of Electrical Workers,
251 N.L.R.B. No. 39 (Aug. 19, 1980); Caterpillar Tractor Co., 250 N.L.R.B. No.
89 (July 10, 1980).
See Appendix, Table I, note 1, supra &Appendix, Table II, note 1, supra.
See Appendix, Table I, note 2, supra& Appendix, Table II, note 2, supra.
3 See Appendix, Table I, note 3, supra.
2

See Appendix, Table I, note 4, supra &Appendix, Table II, note 3, supra.
5 See Appendix, Table I, note 5, supra.
6 See Appendix, Table I, note 6, supra& Appendix, Table II, note 4, supra.
4

7 See Appendix, Table I, note 7, supra.

8 See Appendix, Table I, note 8, supra &Appendix, Table II, note 5, supra.

